THE AMERICAN

LAW REGISTER
FOUNDED 1852

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
DEPARTMENT OF LAW

VOL.

52
{143

S. fAy
N.
O.S.

~4
MAY, 1904.

O
No.

5

THE PANAMA SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
THE TREATY OF 1846 BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
NEW GRANADA.
In 1846 the United States negotiated a treaty of "peace,
amity, navigation, and commerce" with New Granada. The
thirty-fifth article of this treaty dealt with the rights and
duties of the high contracting parties in regard to the transit
route across the Isthmus of Panama. A revolution in 1863
changed the name of New Granada to the United States of
Colombia, and another revolution in 1836 resulted in the
promulgation of the present constitution of the centralized
Republic of Colombia. The legal identity of these various
governments is admitted and the names New Granada and
Colombia will be used interchangeably in this article. The
treaty of 1846 had never been denounced and was in full
force between the United States and Colombia on the 3d of
November, 1903, when the revolution resulting in the inde265
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pendence of Panama took place. The legal questions growing out of the construction of the thirty-fifth article of the
treaty of 1846 are interesting in themselves, and a proper
understanding of them is highly important in forming any
intelligent opinion in regard to the course of our government
during the events which led up to the recognition of the independence of Panama.
It is my purpose to discuss from a purely legal stand-point
the meaning of the leading provisions of the thirty-fifth
article of the treaty of 1846, and to apply the law as we find
it to the occurrences between the date of the revolution and
the recognition by the United States of the independence of
Panama. With the political and ethical questions involved
we have nothing to do."
It will be necessary to state the provisions of the treaty in
some detail.
(The fourth, fifth, and sixth articles provide for the reciprocal abolition of all differential duties, discriminating
against the vessels or merchandise of either country.)
Article 35 is as follows:
"The United States of America and the Republic of New
Granada, desiring to make as durable as possible the relations which are to be established between the two parties by
virtue of this treaty, have declared solemnly and do agree to
the following points."
ist. (The first sentence states that the above abolition of
differential duties shall apply to ports of the Isthmus of
Panama and to the goods of citizens of the United States
in transit across the Isthmus.) "The Government of New
Granada guarantees to the Government of the United States
that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama
upon any modes of communication that now exist, or that
may be hereafter constructed, shall be open and free to the
Government and citizens of the United States, and for the
transportation of any articles of produce, manufactures, or
merchandise, of lawful commerce,t belonging to citizens of
'To avoid possible misconstruction it may be well to say that in the
opinion of the writer these extra legal considerations amply justify the
course of the government.
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the United States." (Here follow stipulations in regard to
the tolls which may be charged for transit across the
Isthmus.) "And in order to secure to themselves the tranquil
and constant enjoyment of these advantages, and as an
especial compensation for the said advantages and for the
favors they have acquired by the fourth, fifth, and sixth
articles of this treaty, the United States guarantee positively
and efficaciously to New Granada, by the present stipulation,
the perfect neutrality of the beforementioned Isthmus, with
the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea
may not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time
while this treaty exists; and in consequence, the United
States also guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses
over the said territory."
2d. This article provides that the treaty shall remain in
force for twenty years and abrogates the treaty with the
United States of Colombia of 1824.)
3d. (If no notice is given twelve months before the twenty
years expire the treaty shall remain in force until twelve
months from the time such notice is given.)
4 th. "If any one or more of the citizens of either party
shall infringe any of the articles of this treaty, such citizens
shall be held personally responsible for the same, and the harmony and good correspondence between the nations shall
not be interrupted thereby, each party engaging in no way
to protect the offender or sanction such violation."
5th. "If, unfortunately, any of the articles contained in
this treaty should be violated or infringed in any way whatever, it is expressly stipulated that neither of the two contracting parties shall ordain or authorize any acts of reprisal,
nor shall declare war against the other on complaints of
injuries or damages, until the said party considering itself
offended shall have laid before the other a statement of
such injuries or damages, verified by competent proofs,
demanding justice and satisfaction, and the same shall have
been denied, in violation of the laws and of international
right."
6th. "Any special or remarkable advantage that one or the

268

THE PANAMA SITUATION.

other power may enjoy, from the foregoing stipulations, are
and ought to be always understood in virtue and as compensation of the obligations they have just contracted and
which have been specified in the first number of this article." 2
Three substantive propositions seem to be laid down in the
thirty-fifth article, viz.:
Ist. New Granada guarantees to the United States the free
and open transit of the Isthmus by all present and future
means of transportation.
2d. The United States guarantee to New Granada the neuitrality of the Isthmus to the end that the free transit may not
be interrupted.
3d. The United States guarantee the sovereignty and
property which New Granada has over the Isthmus.
These propositions appear innocent enough at first sight,
but when examined as they have been examined during the
last two months in the light of the historical and physical
facts of the last fifty years and in the light of all the decisions and dicta (if I may use the words) of American and
Colombian diplomats, presidents, lawyers, naval commanders,
and revolutionists, it speedily becomes apparent that they
might well have emanated from the Delphic oracle..
The first question to dispose of, because if answered in the
affirmative it would at once settle the law in favor of Colombia,3 is the question as to the scope of the American guarantee of the sovereignty and property which Colombia has over
the Isthmus. Do the United States bind themselves to
maintain the sovereignty of Colombia against domestic
insurrection ?
The guarantee is general in its terms. Domestic dangers
'Compilation of Treaties in Force,

1899, pp. 134-136.

'Senator Hoar, while maintaining that the treaty binds the United

States to defend Colombian sovereignty against domestic insurrection,
supports the recent action of the administration on the ground that this
guarantee does not apply when the insurrection is brought on by the
injustice of the legitimate government, and that we are the judge of
the ethics of the situation. See CongressionalRecord for February 22d,
p. 2278. This suggestion does not seem in accord with the rule that all
wars are just in the contemplation of the law. See Hall's International
Law, 4th edition, p. 351.
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are not specifically mentioned. According to the rule of construction applicable to such cases laid down by Hall, admittedly the standard authority, this would not include a
guarantee against domestic violence.
"When a guarantee is given by a single state . . . it
must be acted upon at the demand of the country benefited
• . . unless the circumstances giving rise to the call upon
the guaranteeing power are of the nature of internal political
changes; a guarantee given to a particular dynasty, for example, is good only against external foes and not against the
effects of revolution at home, unless the latter object be specifically mentioned." 4
The circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the
treaty and the practical interpretation which has been placed
upon it disclose no reasons why the general rule should not
apply.
The provisions in regard to the American guarantee, as
we shall see in more detail later, were suggested by the
Granadian negotiator and were supported by a "secret and
confidential" exposition of the "reasons that make the stipulations of the treaty proposed useful and acceptable to the
United States of America." In this interesting and important document Mr. Mallarino, Granadian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, rests his entire argument upon the following
propositions: that Great Britain is pursuing a policy of
aggression in the New World and is attempting to carry out
a "long meditated intention of grasping the most mercantile
spots in America ;" that if the "usurpation" of the Isthmus
in its channelizable portion should be added to these encroachments" the interests of the United States would suffer;
by inserting the guarantee clause as an equivalent for the
abolition of the differential duties, Great Britain and other
powers would not only be compelled by fear of the United
States, but persuaded by self-interest to join in the guarantee; that therefore the United States could perform the obligations imposed by the clause "without having to fear the
eventuality of a war with any other power in order to main-
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tain the sovereignty of New Granada over the Isthmus," and
that the proposed plan is ' entirely exempt from any cost or
risk." 5 In all this there is not the slightest suggestion that
the guarantee of sovereignty and property could relate to
anything except the aggressions of foreign powers, particularly England. Considering the fact that Panama, then as
now, was in a chronic state of revolution, the assurance that
the guarantee was without "cost or risk" seems a little
strong even for a South American diplomat if the United
States were engaging to put down all these revolutions:
But granting that the Granadian negotiator might make
such a statement, the supposition that any sane American
diplomat would accept it, or that any President or Senate
would have ratified the treaty if they had understood that
the guarantee applied to local revolutions, is improbable in
the extreme.
But, fortunately, the point has been squarely raised and
settled. In 1862 revolutionary disturbances of unusual
virulence were afflicting Panama in common with the rest
of Colombia. The revolution resulted in turning New
Granada into the United States of Colombia. While the
revolution was in progress the Colombian minister, who of
course represented the legitimate government, appealed to
Secretary Seward for aid according to the terms of the
treaty. He argued that this was not a case of mere civil
commotion, because the new faction, calling itself the United
States of Colombia, was a new member of the family of
nations, qualified by its constitution to take over more territory than was embraced within New Granada, thus impliedly admitting that the guarantee did not apply to domestic struggles as to which faction should rule over the
identical territory of New Granada, and perhaps impliedly
claiming that it would apply to any attempt to set up a new
sovereignty, including the Isthmus, composed in part onli
of the territory of New Granada. 6 Seward was too busy
with the Civil War to say anything very important as to
' Senate Document, 58th

Congress, ist Session, No. 17, i7-i9.
'Senate Document, 58th Congress, 2d Session, No. 143, pp. 12-14.

THE PANAMA

SITUATION.

the meaning of the treaty; the important point is that his
inaction in the premises met the approval of the revolutionists, who soon came into power.7 In 1865 Mosquera, the
leader of the revolutionists, was President of the new federal republic with an extreme states-rights constitution which
permitted nullification of national acts by the state governments: No sooner were national affairs settled than Panama proceeded to go through a very salutary local revolution,
which resulted in the exchange of one Colancha for one Jil
Colunje as local President." Under a unique rule of constitutional construction Mosquera had held that the General
Government had no authority to interfere in local revolutions, and he accordingly accepted the newauthorities. When
the exiled Colancha gathered together his defeated adherents
in the neighboring state of Cauca and started for Panama
with a counter revolution, Mosquera, forgetful of his own
feelings in j862, characterized him as a bandit and called
upon the United States through Minister Burton to perform
"what he considered their duty by preventing this or any
other hostile party or individuals from landing within the
limits of the state and employing the necessary force to expel
such in case a landing should be effected." 9 Mr. Burton
notfified the American naval and consular officers on the Isthmus of the expected incursion and of the demands of the
President, and added that he concurred in the latter's interpretation of the obligations of the treaty. Admiral Pearson
and Commander Davenport, then acting consul, replied at
once, taking issue vigorously with the President's view of
the treaty. These officers contended that the liability of the
United States in case of domestic insurrections was strictly
limited to maintaining the freedom of transit. The whole
matter went to Secretary Seward for his decision. He took
the opinion of Attorney-General Speed, who advised, November 7th, 1865:
See Foreign Relations, 1866-67, p. 565.
Relations, 1866-67, title "Colombia."
'Mr. Burton to Commander Preble, Aug. 3, i865, Foreign Relations, 1866-67, p. 464, Senate Document, 56th Congress, 2d Session,
8 Foreign

No. 143, P. 31.
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"From this treaty it cannot be supposed that New Granada invited the United States to become a party to the intestine troubles of that government, nor did the United States
become bound to take sides in the domestic broils of New
Granada. The United States did guarantee New Granada
in the sovereignty and property over 10 the territory. This
was as against foreign governments."
Accordingly Secretary Seward wrote to Minister Burton
summarizing and adopting the conclusions of the AttorneyGeneral. He said in part:
"The purpose of the stipulation was to guarantee the
Isthmus against seizure or invasion by a foreign power only.
It could not have been contemplated that we were to become
a party to any civil war in that country by defending the
Isthmus against another. party." "
Minister Burton was naturally mortified at the failure of
the Department to sustain his interpretation of the treaty
and eager to retrieve his mistake. He did not have long to
wait. September 3d, 1866, the Colombian Secretary of Foreign Affairs notified him "that private intelligence worthy
of credit has just been received that preparations are being
made in the State of Panama for an uprising, proclaiming
its separation from the United States of Colombia." 12 The
communication contained a request that Mr. Burton notify
the Americans on the Isthmus, and particularly the agents
"0Vol. XI, Opinions of Attorneys-General, p. 393.

The AttorneyGeneral laid special stress on the fourth clause of the thirty-fifth article
as given above. He argued that inasmuch as this clause was mutual
and gave the United States no more rights over the citizens of New

Granada than it did New Granada over United States citizens, it would
be inconsistent with the guarantee clause if the latter authorized the
United States to take part in the domestic troubles of New Granada.
The force of this argument is not perceived.
Some language is used in the opinion which indicates that the AttorneyGeneral possibly thought that the guarantee of the neutrality of the right

of way was similarly limited-i.e., to cases of disturbance caused by a
foreign power. But Secretary Seward expressly points out in his letter

to Mr. Burton adopting the opinion that this question had not arisen.
' Mr. Seward to Mr. Burton, Nov. 9th, i865, Senate Document, 58th
Cong., 2d Session, No. 143, p. 27.
' Mr. Garrido to Mr. Burton, Sept. 3d, i866, Senate Document, 58th
Cong., 2d Session, No. 143, P. 34.
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of the Panama Railroad, to keep themselves free from complicity with the movement, and closed with a vague reference to the treaty. Mr. Burton saw his chance to raise the
question of the scope of the guarantee clause and secure an
admission that the interpretation of the Attorney-General
was correct. He replied, denying that the Americans on the
Isthmus were lending any encouragement to the alleged revolt, and suggesting that the Colombian note left him in
some doubt as to the precise meaning attached.to the treaty
by the Colombian Government, and pointing out the necessity of coming to a clear understanding in regard to the
obligations imposed upon the United States by the guarantee
clause, at least so far as it applied to the circumstances in
hand. lHe concluded his note with the following clear-cut
inquiry:
"To enable the United States to act understandingly and
effectively in the premises, it is believed important that they
should know whether Colombia holds it their duty under the
existing treaty stipulations between the two countries to aid,
when called on by Colombia to do so, in suppressing such a
movement as that contemplated in his Excellency's note, or
any other disturbance confined to Colombian citizens, or
whether the treaty guaranty is understood as limited in its
application to attempts against the neutrality, sovereignty,
and property of the Isthmus by powers foreign to Colombia." 13
Mr. Burton followedup this note with a personal interview
which was entirely satisfactory, and two days later received
the following reply:
"As to the interposition due from the Government of the
United States by the treaty existing between the two nations in the event that an insurrection by armed force should
take place on the Isthmus for the purpose of segregating it
from the Union, the Government of Colombia understands
that if such a movement should be effected with the view of
making that section of the Republic independent and attach21Mr. Burton to Mr. Garrido, Sept 12th, I866, Senate Document, 58th
Cong., 2d Session, No. 143, p. 40.
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ing it to any other foreign nation or power,-that is to say
in order to transfer by any means whatever the sovereignty
which Colombia justly possesses over that territory to any
foreign nation or power whatever,-the case will then have
arisen when the United States of America, in fulfilment of
their obligation contracted by the thirty-fifth article of the
treaty existing between the two Republics, should come to
the assistance of Colombia to maintain its sovereignty over
the Isthmus, but not when the disturbances are confined to
Colombian citizens." 14
The possible ambiguity involved in the phrase, "making
that section of the Republic independent and attaching it to
any foreign nation or power," is satisfactorily explained by
the next clause-" that is to say, in order to transfer by any
means whatever the sovereignty which Colombia justly possesses over that territory to any foreign nation or power
whatever." The Colombian Secretary clearly says that if
Panama revolts for the purpose of segregating itself from
the Union in order to become independent, the United States
are not bound to interfere, but if the object of the movement is annexation to some foreign power the guarantee of
the treaty becomes effective. Mr. Burton, who had the advantage of a personal interview and who himself entertained
a contrary view, so understood him. He reported the results
of his correspondence as follows:
"The result has been that the Colombian Government
declares that it does not feel itself authorized by the treaty
to require the aid of the United States for the suppression
of an insurrection, rebellion, or other disturbance on the Isthmus on the part of Colombian citizens, not even an invasion
by another Colombian state, unless such movement be intended to detach the state of Panama from the Colombian
Union and to annex it to a foreign power. This would
seem to leave the Isthmus free to declare itself independent of the United States of Colombia, without fear of
the forced intervention of the United States of America, pro', Senate Document, 58th Congress, 2d Session, No. 143, p. 41.
Garrido to Mr. Burton, Sept. 14th, i866.

Mr.
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vided such declaration be not accompanied by the end of
annexation to a foreign power. If such purpose be not declared at the time and the Isthmus should secure its independence, which is admissible under the construction just
adopted by this Government, it would appear too late to then
invoke the help of the United States to subjugate it again
to Colombian rule in case it should afterwards attempt to
unite itself to another nation." '1
And he adds an interesting prophecy:
" Should this view of the Colombian Government become
known to the people of Panama, it is entirely safe to predict
a revolutionary movement for independence at no very distant day, which, unless it shall be so indiscreetly conducted
as to call for the interference of the United States, will very
likely be made good."
Minister Burton was possibly a little provoked at the Colombian Government for failing to make at least some show
of maintaining the interpretation he himself had at first
adopted, a construction which he says had always been entertained by the Colombian Government, including President
Mosquera, the real negotiator of the treaty on the part of
(Colombia) until 1862, when as dictator he adopted an inter-

pretation better suited to the circumstances then surrounding
him." '1 He was at first inclined to believe that the Colombian note which raised the question was sent without the
knowledge of the President as a feeler to ascertain what the
attitude of the United States would be in case the exiles of
the Colunje-Colancha revolution finally carried out their
threatened counter-revolution. Color was lent to this idea
by the fact that one of these exiles was now under-secretary
for foreign affairs. Still later he reports that these exiles
were partisans of the President; that it was generally supposed he would manage to have them restored to power in
Panama; 17 that the President had reversed his ruling as
to the constitutionality of intervention in local revolutions by
Mr. Burton to Mr. Seward, Oct. 3d, i866, Foreign Relations, i86667, p. 574, Senate Document, 58, 2d, No. I43, pP. 35-36.
"Senate Document, 58th Cong., 2d Session, No. 43, P. 35.
' TForeign Relations, 1866--67, p. 582.
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the general government, and that he had ordered national
troops to Panama "to preserve order there as he pritends,
but really, as is generally supposed, to bring about an overthrow of the state government of Panama and to substitute
the parties deposed in 1865." Il From all this, if true, we
may perhaps get the basis for an inference that the request
for American interference was for "home consumption
only," and that one reason why the President accepted Secretary Seward's view of the treaty was that he did not wish
the United States to interfere with the particular revolutioi
in question.
But, after all, the mental processes of the picturesque old
reprobate who ruled Colombia at that time are "interesting
rather thar important." It may be that he was hampered
by the attitude which he had taken in the days when, himself a revolutionist, the "legation which deemed itself authorized to represent the Granadian Confederation," as his
Secretary of State euphemistically put it, sought to invoke
the treaty against him and failed. It may be that the revolution had his secret good wishes. It may even be that a
man who construed the constitution of his own country to
permit local option in revolutions, and then reversed this
ruling when his own friends seemed to be suffering, from
it, was not a high authority on the construction of treaties.
But President Mosquera was the de jure President and de
facto government of Colombia, and his admission clinches
the American contention already favored by the general
rules of construction by a priori considerations, and by the
circumstances leading up to the negotiation of the treaty,
that the guarantee of sovereignty and property contained in
the first clause of Article 35 had no reference to domestic
revolutions even though aimed at the independence of Panama.
In view of the fact that this interpretation, formally sanctioned by both parties, had stood unquestioned for nearly
fifty years, it seems that Secretary Hay was clearly right
Foreign Relations, i866-67, p. 567.
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when he closed his discussion of this point in his recent
correspondence with General Reyes with the statement:
"The theory on which the statement of grievances proceeds, that the treaty obliged the Government of the United
States to protect the Government of New Granada against
domestic insurrection or its consequences, finds no support in
the record and is in its nature inadmissible." 19
We have noticed that the treaty contains three distinct
guarantees, two on the part of the United .States, one on
the part of Granada. We have been discussing the second
guarantee of the United States, the guarantee of sovereignty
and property.
Let us now turn to the guarantee on the part of New
Granada. New Granada guarantees to the United States
the right of way over the Isthmus. This, of course, imposed
upon New Granada the primary duty of maintaining the
freedom of transit, and in case she fails to do so renders
her liable in damages. On this point there is no room for
argument. As early as 1857 Secretary Cass negotiated a
claims convention with New Granada which provides for
reference to a commission of
"All claims of citizens of the United States upon citizens
'Mr. Hay to General Reyes, Jan. 5th, i9o4, Senate Document, 58th
Congress, 2d Session, No. 95, p. 92. See also the declaratory words in
a project for a protocol submitted by the Colombian Minister to Secretary Evarts in i88i, Foreign Relations, 1881, p. 362.
" The guarantee of sovereignty consists in this, that the United States
of America shall, by the necessary measures, including the use of force,
prevent the territory in question from being the object of conquest or
usurpation, or intrigues which shall tend to separate it from the Colombian Union, employed by any foreign power."
Those who are interested in the arguments for the Colombian contention may be referred to Mr. Burton's despatch to Mr. Seward, Nov.
5th, 1865, Senate Document, 58th Cong., 2d Session, No. 143, p. 27,
Foreign Relations, 1866, p. 461, to Senator Hoar's speech in the Senate,

Feb. 22d, 19o4, Congressional Record, Feb. 22d, p. 2276, and to an interesting and able article in the Advocate of Peace for Jan., 1904. These

arguments so far as they rely on authority are based on general
expressions where the precise point in question is not involved, and
appear to confuse the guarantee of sovereignty and property with the
guarantee of the neutrality of the transit which will be considered
later. The most important documents were not available at the time
the article in the Advocate of Peace was written.
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of New Granada

. .

. and especially those for damages

which were caused by the riot at Panama on the i5th of
April, 1856, for which the said Government of New Granada
acknowledges its liability arising out of its privileges and
obligation to preserve peace and order along the transit
route." 20

Our government has always held this view. Says Secretary Fish:
"But it is regarded as the undoubted duty of the Colombian Government to protect the road against attacks from
local insurgents. The discharge of this duty will be insisted upon." 21

When Secretary Hay authorized Vice-Consul-General
Ehrman to recognize the de facto Republic of Panama he
instructed him to look to it for all due action to protect the
persons and property of citizens of the United States and
to keep open the Isthmian transit in accordance with the
obligations of existing treaties" (i.e., the treaty of 1846, the
obligations of which were assumed to have passed to Panama). 22 Mr. Ehrman gave the notification in Mr. Hay's
language and the Panama authorities admitted the asserted
liability.23
The guarantee of freedom of transit on the part of New
Granada is placed between the clause expressly stipulating
that the abolition of differential duties on American goods
and vessels shall apply to the ports of the Isthmus of Panama, and the clause providing that the tolls charged American citizens for crossing the Isthmus shall be the same
' Senate Miscellaneous Documents, 36th Congress, 2d Session, No. 13,
P. 3 (italics mine). See also Moore's History and Digest of International Arbitrations of the United States, Vol. 2, pp. 1361-142o, especially

1369. It should be noted that as a matter of fact the Granadian police
force actively participated in the riot of i856 and shot down unoffending
American citizens. It does not appear that New Granada or Colombia
ever paid damages for mere failure to maintain peace and order along
the transit route. -See the case of the Montijo, Moore, Vol. 2, p. 1421.
' Mr. Fish to-Mr. Scruggs, Oct. 29th, 1873, Foreign Relations, 187475, P. 363.
' Mr. Hay to Mr. Ehrman, Nov. 6th, i903, Senate Document, 58th
Cong., 2d Session, No. 5i, p. 1o7.
"Senate Document, 58th Cong., 2d Session, No. 5i, p. 128.
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as those charged Granadians. There is nothing to indicate
that a breach of the clause in regard to freedom of transit
would justify self help on the part of the United States any
more than a breach of the clause which immediately precedes
or follows. Culpable failure on the part of New Granada
to maintain freedom of transit would of course be a breach
of the obligations imposed by the treaty, just as the imposition of differential duties would be a breach of the treaty.
Such failure on the part of Granada would therefore form a
proper basis for a "statement of damages" such as is provided for by the fifth section of the thirty-fifth article. If
this appeal to diplomacy proved unavailing reprisals or war
would follow at the option of the United States. But the
Granadian guarantee of freedom of transit gives the United
States no special treaty right to intervene. They have merely
the general right, which every nation has, to punish violations of treaty rights, and this general right is in this instance
specially qualified by a condition precedent-viz., the presentation of a statement of damages and failure of redress.
If the United States have any right or duty to intervene to
secure the freedom24of transit, we must find it in some other
part of the treaty.
This brings us to the consideration of the most important
provision of the treaty, the storm centre during the recent
debates over the Panama treaty-the American guarantee
of the.neutrality of the Isthmus. It reads:
" . . . The United States guarantee positively and efficaciously to New Granada by the present stipulations the
perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned Isthmus with the
view that the free transit from one to the other sea may not
be interrupted or embarrassed at any future time while this
treaty exists." . . .
Three questions arise in regard to this guarantee.
First: Is it effective against domestic insurrections which
affect the freedom of transit, or is it, like the guarantee of
sovereignty and property, confined to interference with the
freedom of transit on the part of foreign powers?
-*But see on this point Professor Morey's Article on "International
Right of Way" in the American Lawyer for February, i9o4.
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Second: Does it become effective only upon the demand of
New Granada or may the United States intervene upon their
own motion?
Third: In case the United States do intervene (whether
at the request of New Granada or upon their own motion)
may they act solely with a view to maintaining the freedom
of transit with the least possible risk and expense to themselves, or must they regard the primary rights of sovereignty
and property of New Granada?
Let us take these questions up in their order. Does the
guarantee of neutrality apply to local disturbances affecting
transit or is it confined to cases of foreign intervention?
According to the general rule of construction cited above,
if the guarantee is general and there is nothing to indicate a
contrary intention, it should be construed as applying only
to cases of foreign intervention. Here we do have a general
guarantee of "the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned
Isthmus;" but this general expression is immediately explained by the following words, which show the purpose for
which the guarantee was given: "With the view that the
free transit from one to the other sea may not be interrupted
or embarrassed in any future time while this treaty exists."
Inasmuch as the purpose of the guarantee-the freedom of
transit-would be as completely defeated by an interruption
of the transit growing out of domestic insurrection as out
of foreign war, it would seem that the general rule must
yield to the declared intention of the parties.
But there is another even stronger reason for holding this
view. We have already seen that by the next clause the
United States guarantee the sovereignty and property of
New Granada over the entire Isthmus. The guarantee of
the neutrality of the transit route given in this clause, never
having been concurred in by any other power except the
United States, is, of course, not a neutralization of the
Isthmus in the technical sense of the term. It is merely a
pledge of protection on the part of the United States, i.e.,
it is a guarantee of the sovereignty and property of New
Granada over the transit route. That being so, if this guarantee of neutrality of the transit route extends only to cases
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of foreign intervention, it is rendered entirely superfluous
by the following clause, which extends the same guarantee
over the entire Isthmus. On the other hand, if we construe
the guarantee of neutrality to extend to all interruptions of
the freedom of transit from whatever source, and the guarantee of sovereignty and property to extend to all intrusions
upon the Isthmus on the part of foreign powers, whether
the freedom of transit was endangered or not, every word
in the sentence has its appropriate purpose. A construction
which renders inoperative so considerable a part of the language of a treaty is not to be adopted if there is any reasonable construction which gives effect to the whole. Although
it would have been very unreasonable to construe the guarantee of sovereignty and property oyer the entire Isthmus
to extend to domestic insurrection, thus forcing the United
States to become a party to every civil war upon the Isthmus, the result has shown that there was nothing particularly
onerous in their undertaking to guarantee the freedom of
transit from interruption from any and every source, subject, as we have seen, to the primary guarantee on the part
of"Since
New Granada.
one construction disregards the express object
of
the guarantee and renders inoperative a considerable portion
of the language of the sentence, while the other construction,
not unreasonable in itself, insures the accomplishment of the
declared object of the clause and gives effect to all parts of
the sentence, we must conclude that so far as appears from
the treaty itself the guarantee of neutrality with a view to
free transit extends to all interruption of traffic whether
caused by local insurrections or foreign wars.
Turning from the treaty to its diplomatic glosses, we find
that while upon one occasion the general expressions of the
foreign departments of both governments seemed to negative
the construction contended for above, in practice it has always been acted upon and of late years has been formally
adopted by both countries.
Previous to November, 1865, American marines were
landed three times during domestic disturbances at the in-
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stance of the local authorities to protect property and maintain order.
In November, 1865, Seward in declining, as we have seen,
to intervene to suppress a domestic insurrection which was
not alleged to have threatened the transit route, wrote to
Minister Burton:
"As it may be presumed, however, that our object in
entering into such a stipulation was to secure the freedom of
transit across the Isthmus, if that freedom should be endangered or obstructed, the employment of force on our part
to prevent this would be a question of grave expediency to
be determined by circumstances. The Department is not
aware that there is yet occasion for a decision on this
point." 25
During the second revolution of the year 1873, in which
the local government troops stationed on the Isthmus joined
the insurgents and serious interference with transit was only
prevented by the interference of the American forces under
Admiral Alny, the Secretary of the Panama Railroad asked
Secretary Fish to remonstrate with the Colombian Government and if possible to secure adequate protection for the
road. He referred at the same time to the American guarantee. Mr. Fish responded:
"This government, by the treaty with New Granada of
1846, has engaged in a guarantee of neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama. This engagement, however, has never been
acknowledged to embrace the duty of protecting the road
across it from the violence of local factions. Although such
protection was of late efficiently given by the force under
the command of Admiral Almy, it appears to have been
granted with the consent and at the instance of the local
authorities. 2 6 It is, however, regarded as the undoubted
duty of the Colombian Government to protect the road
against attacks from local insurgents. The discharge of
this duty will be insisted upon."
Mr. Seward to Mr. Burton, Nov. 9th, 1865, Senate Document, 58th
Cong., 2d Session, No. 143, p. 27.
Wharton's Digest, Vol. 2, p. io5.
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Mr. Fish instructed Mr. Scruggs, our Minister to Colombia, in the same sense, and directed him to demand the fulfilment of the Colombian guarantee of free transit. Mr.
Scruggs accordingly addressed a letter to the Colombian Secretary, Jil Colunje (our old revolutionary friend, perhaps),
in which he used the following language:
"By the treaty with New Granada of 1846, the obligations of which were assumed by its successor, the United
States of Colombia, the government of the undersigned engaged to guarantee the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama.
But this engagement has never been acknowledged to embrace the duty of protecting the road across the Isthmus from
the violence of local factions. It is therefore regarded as the
undoubted duty of the Government of Colombia to protect
that road against the attacks from local insurgents.
The undersigned is accordingly instructed by his government to bring the matter to the attention of your Excellency,
and to ask that a sufficient force be kept on the Isthmus to
deter attacks upon the road, its officers and employees." 2T
The Colombian Secretary responded as follows:
" As the honorable Minister in his note observes, the stipulations of the treaty of 1846, by which his government compromised itself to guarantee the neutrality of the Isthmus of
Panama, did not include the obligation to protect the railroad
against the class of violences referred to, the undersigned
makes known from the present that the Colombian Government has considered, and will always consider as its exclusive
function and duty to give that protection, a protection which
this government has never refused, although it may have
appeared inadequate during the late disturbances, on account
of the magnitude of the acts committed at so great a distance
from this capital. Furthermore, the undersigned communicates to his Excellency the Minister, that on the fifteenth of
the present month a decree was made, to the end that hereafter no disturbance may be permitted on the line of the railway, a decree for the prompt enforcement of which there
"Mr. Scruggs to Mr. Colunje, Dec. i9th, 1873, Foreign Relations,
1874-75, p. 356.
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will always be a sufficient national force in Panama at the
disposal of the state government." 28
On first reading these expressions seem decisive against
the construction contended for. But it must be remembered
that when Mr. Fish and Mr. Scruggs said that "the guarantee had never been acknowledged to embrace the duty of
protecting the road across it (the Isthmus) from the violence
of local factions," they were evidently referring to Mr.
Seward's action in 1865, and that Mr. Seward had expressly
limited himself to deciding the case before him-viz., a casewhere the freedom of transit was not even alleged to be in
danger and where, therefore, it was entirely unnecessary to
consider the effect of the guarantee we are now discussing,
the guarantee of the neutrality of the Isthmus with the view
that the freedom of transit should not be interrupted. It was
only necessary for Mr. Seward to construe the guarantee of
sovereignty and property. Again it is to be noted that in
the actual circumstances which Mr. Fish and the Colombian
Secretary had in mind, it was clearly the duty of Colombia
to protect the road under her primary guarantee of the freedom of transit. She had been shamefully derelict in not
maintaining sufficient troops on the Isthmus to fulfil her engagements; the few troops present had gone over to the insurgents, and it had become necessary for the United States
to intervene to protect the freedom of transit against the
national troops of Colombia. In asserting and admitting the
primary duty and privilege on the part of Colombia under
these circumstances both Mr. Fish and the Colombian Secretary seem to have lost sight of the fact that this did not by
any means negative the existence of a secondary duty and
privilege on the part of the United States. Mr. Fish in
making an entirely proper demand seems to have relied on
a mistaken reference to a former precedent; the Colombian
Secretary in admitting a plain duty seems to have incautiously conceded more than was necessary.
But whatever importance might attach to this incident
standing alone, the views then expressed have been long since
Foreign Relations, 1874-75, p. 356.
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repudiated by both governments. Mr. Scruggs stayed at his
post long enough to see the Department at Washington abandon the ground he had apparently won. In 1885 the revolution which resulted in the establishment of the present Centralized Republic was in progress; the local government was
powerless to protect the transit. The Colombian Government
thereupon informed Mr. Scruggs:
"That the time has arrived for soliciting the intervention
of the government which your Excellency so worthily represents in accordance with Article 35 of the treaty of Dec. 12th,
1846, to the end that pending the arrival there of the national
troops said government will undertake to maintain harmless
the rights and authority of the Colombian Government in the
State of Panama." 2 9
In response to this request American forces were landed to
protect the transit. Secretary Bayard informed the Colombian Minister that this was done " solely in order that the
duty might be fulfilled which is renderedincumbent upon the
nation by the treaty of 1846." 30 Or as President Cleveland
put it in his Annual Message in 1885: "Emergencies growing out of the civil war in the United States of Colombia demanded . . .the employment of armed forces to fulfil its
guarantees under the thirty-fifth article of the treaty of
1846." President Cleveland and Secretary Bayard completely ignored the dictum of Secretary Fish in 1873 and
asserted and acted upon the proposition that the American
guarantee of the neutrality of the Isthmus with the view
that transit might not be interrupted extended to domestic
as well as foreign difficulties.
This ruling was followed by President Roosevelt when
he directed the landing of American forces during the domestic disturbances of 19O1 and 1902 avowedly to enforce the
guarantees of the treaty. In the first of these instances the
American marines were landed at the request of the local
authorities, in the second without such request. But both
Mr. Restrepo to Mr. Scruggs, April 14th, 1885, Foreign Relations,

1885, p. 210.
'*Mr. Becerra to Mr. Bayard, April 4th, 1885. (memorandum of conversation), Senate Document, 58th Congress, 2d Session, No. 143, p. 63.
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instances are equally good authority for the proposition in
which we are at present interested.
Our survey of the precedents shows that American troops
have been landed seven times during domestic insurrections;
that the application of the guarantee of neutrality to domestic
difficulties has never been denied except by way of dictum in
1873; that it has since that time been three times expressly
asserted, twice with the hearty approval of both governments.
Under these circumstances it would seem that we are justified in concluding that the precedents sustain our a priori
conclusion that the American guarantee of the neutrality of the transit route applies to both domestic insurrections and
foreign wars.
The second question which we have propounded in regard to the -American guarantee of neutrality is: Does it
become effective only upon the demand of New Granada
or may the United States intervene upon their own motion ? 31
' All discussion of the interesting questions which might arise as to
the duties of the United States when requested to fulfil the guarantees
by New Granada is omitted from the text as unnecessary for our present
purpose. It will be noted that according to our interpretation of the
treaty New Granada and the United States both guarantee the freedom
of. transit across the Isthmus. This would be inconsistent and meaningless unless we admit that there are some circumstances under which
New Granada may rightfully shift her primary liability to the United
States. What these circumstances are is not stated in the treaty; we
are left to find them out as best we. may. New Granada being in possession of the Isthmus, undoubtedly one prerequisite to any right on
her part to expect the assistance of the United States in the maintenance of free transit is a request to that effect on the-part of New
Granada. But is the United States always bound to intervene upon
request? Or is it necessary that traffic be actually interrupted? Or
does New Granada owe a duty to exhaust all available means at her
c6mmand before calling upon the United States? These questions
have never been authoritatively answered. The interests of the United
Statei in the freedom of transit have been so great that there has be.n
little disposition to define or limit the occasions on which New Granada
has a right to our assistance. Perhaps the most useful suggestions on
the subject are those made by Captain Perry of the "Iowa" in IgoI.
He expressed the opinion that it was unquestionably the duty of Colombia to exhaust her own means of maintaining the freedom of transit before calling upon the United States, but added that as a practical
matter he would act as soon as traffic was actually interrupted. 'But
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The rule of construction governing this question is unquestioned. Hall states it as follows:
"Guarantees may either be mutual and consist in the assurance to one party of something for its benefit in consideration of the assurance by it to the other of something else
to the advantage of the latter, as in the treaty of Tilsit, by
which France and Russia guaranteed to each other the integrity of their respective possessions; or they may be undertaken by one or more powers for the benefit of a third, as in
the treaty of the 15th of April, 1856, by which England,
Austria, and France guaranteed 'jointly and severally the
independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, recorded in the treaty concluded at Paris on the 3oth of
March;' or, finally, they may be a form of assuring the observance of an arrangement entered into for the general
benefit of the contracting parties, as in the treaties of 1831
and 1839, by which Belgium was constituted an independent
and neutral state in the common interests of the contracting
powers, and while placed under an obligation to maintain
neutrality received a guarantee that it should be enabled to
do so, or in the treaty of November, 1855, by which Sweden
and Norway engaged not to cede or exchange with Russia,
nor to permit the latter to occupy any part of the territory
belonging to the crowns of Sweden and Norway, nor to
concede any right of pasturage or fishery or other rights of
any nature whatsoever, in consideration of a guarantee by
England and France of the Swedish and Norwegian terrihe declined to interfere on the request of the local authorities when
they merely feared that traffic might be interrupted in the future. The
captain's exegesis did not meet the approval of the local authorities.
He reports to the Secretary of the Navy:
"This seemed a disappointment to them, as they evidently wanted
me to land at once, thinking by so doing it might prevent the liberals
from coming in and capturing Panama. In other words, in their weakness and incapacity they want the United States to protect them from
their enemies, while they sit hopelessly incompetent. The Alcalde, who
was present, could not refrain from making some remarks which were
offensive about a house burning and not coming to put it out, which
necessitated my speaking to him in a sharp manner. They then withdrew." See Senate Document, 58th Cong., 2d Session, No. 143, pp.
noi and 2W.
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tory. In the two former cases a guarantor can only intervene on the demand of the party or, where more than one is
concerned, of the parties interested, because the state in favor
of which the guarantee has been given is the best judge of
its own interests, and as the guarantee purports to have been
given solely or at least primarily for its benefit, no advantage
which may happen to accrue to the guaranteeing state from
the arrangements to the preservation of which the guarantee
is directed, can invest that latter power with a right to enforce them independently. In the last-mentioned case, on theother hand, any guarantor is at liberty to take the initiative,
every guaranteeing state being at the same time a party
primarily benefited." 32
If, therefore, the American guarantee of the freedom of
transit (and, of course, the same is true of 'the guarantee of
sovereignty) was inserted for the benefit of New Granada
alone, the United States has no right to enforce it except on
the request of New Granada. If, on the other hand, the
guarantee was .inserted for the benefit of the United States
alone or for the joint benefit of the United States and New
Granada, the United States, being in either case a party
primarily interested, may intervene whenever in their opinion
a proper occasion has arisen. We must therefore decide
whether the American guarantee confers a right or acknowledges a duty or whether it does both.
To decide this question we must examine the stipulations
of the treaty in the light of the circumstances of its origin and
the facts of its history. The treaty reads:
"_And, in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and
constant enjoyment of these advantages, and as an especial
compensation for the said advantages and for the favors
they have acquired by the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of
this treaty, the United States guarantee, etc."
It is submitted that on its face this sentence says that there
are two reasons for giving the guarantee: first, it was given
in order that the United States may secure-i.e., maintaina free and constant right of transit (the transit being the
" Hall, p. 356.
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advantage referred to; see treaty as quoted supra) ; second,
it was given as an especial compensation for this right of
transit and for the abolition of the differential duties granted
by the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles. The first reason is
for the advantage of the United States; the second for the
advantage of New Granada. The first reason indicates a
benefit to the United States; the second a burden on the
United States. The first makes the guarantee a right; the
second a duty.
As far as phraseology goes, neither of these reasons is
given precedence over the other. The words "As an especial compensation" do not mean especially as a compensation.
They refer to the fact that the United States had already
given a general compensation for the abolition of the differential duties by the Granadian government by agreeing to
a reciprocal abolition on their own part. In so far as the
language of the sentence assigns any priority to one reason
over the other, it may fairly be claimed for the reason which
is first stated. But this is not necessary; it is sufficient if
we establish that two co6rdinate reasons are given.
It will be remembered that there are also two distinct guarantees given by the United States.
The United States guarantee the perfect neutrality of the
Isthmus to the end that free transit may not be interrupted.
The United States guarantee the property and sovereignty
of Colombia over the Isthmus as against any foreign power.
It is not claimed that any precise apportionment of
benefit and burden between these two guarantees can be
made, and it is admitted that it might at times (especially
in view of our policy of late years) be thought an advantage
to the United States to have the right to warn foreign powers
off the Isthmus, even though not actually interrupting the
traffic; and it is likewise admitted that the intervention of
the United States to keep the transit open should operate
for the benefit of New Granada. It is however suggested
that while the guarantee of freedom of transit is, in the sense
in which the word is used by Hall, a primary benefit to both
parties, it is especially a benefit to the United States, while
the guarantee of sovereignty and property is especially a
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benefit to New Granada. These views find confirmation in
the history of the negotiations leading up to the treaty.
Although as early as 1843 the 'Granadian Government
had offered to conclude treaties with Great Britain, France,
and the United States providing for a guarantee of the neutrality of the Isthmus, and although this offer had been
brought to the attention of the State Department, Mr. Bidlack was sent to negotiate a general commercial treaty with
New Granada and a treaty with reference to the right of
transit over the Isthmus without instructions as to the policy*
of the United States in regard to the guarantee. 33 Thetreaty
between the United States and Venezuela of 1836 was taken
as the basis of negotiations. The Granadian negotiator,
however, insisted that the provisions in regard to the transit
of the Isthmus should be inserted in the general treaty, and
that these provisions should include a guarantee of Granadian "territorial possession" of the Isthmus. The points
involved are important and I shall quote liberally from the
despatches.
Mr. Bidlack to Mr. Buchanan, Dec. 9th, 1846:
" . . . I had intended to endeavor to agree upon the terms
of a separate treaty in relation to the Isthmus of Panama;
but in our conversation yesterday Mr. Mallarino intimated
that it would be advisable to inlude both questions or subjects in the one treaty, stating among other reasons that he
did not wish, as long as it could be avoided, to call the attention of the British legation or Government to the movement;
and that if the Granadian Government abolished the differential duties, and ceded to the United States the right of
way across the Isthmus, he presumed the United States
would guarantee to New Granadathe Isthmus,3 4 or at least
as much of it as was required for the construction of a canal
or railroad upon the most favorable route; and, moreover,
that it was important that this guarantee should appear in
the treaty as a condition for the right of way and the abolition of the discriminatingor differential duties;3 5 otherwise
"Senate Document, 58th Cong., ist Session, No. x7, pp. 14-24.
" Italics in original.
" Italics mine.
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New Granada would be obliged to grant the same privileges
unconditionally to England, with which government they
had a treaty to that effect." 36
In the "secret and confidential" report on reasons which
should make the treaty agreeable to the United States, to
which reference has already been made, the Granadian Secretary, while arguing that the guarantee will be advantageous
for the United States, insists that it shall appear as a consideration for the abolition of the differential duties, that is,
as a burden, for the reasons stated above by Mr. Bidlack and
for the additional reason noted once before, that England
and the other European powers would be tempted or forced
to join in the guarantee in order to participate in the commercial advantages of the abolition.
Mr. Bidlack gives his impressions and conclusions based
upon Mr. Mallarino's arguments and his own reflections in
his report to Secretary Buchanan, Dec. 14. He writes:
" . . . With regard to the right of transit and free passage over the Isthmus which appeared to me to be becoming
of more and more importance every day,37 I have only to remark that I have procured the 'largest liberty' and the very
best terms that could be obtained.
"I could not obtain these terms without consenting to
guaranty the integrity and neutrality of the territory; and, in
fact, it seemed to me, upon reflection, that in order to preserve the rights and privileges thus ceded, it would be both
the policy, the interest, and the duty of the United States to
enter into an obligation to protect them." 38
That is, Mr. Bidlack accepted the provisions in regard to
the guarantee for two reasons: first, because they were demanded by the Granadian Secretary; second, because on reflection he had concluded that they were demanded by the
best interests of the United States. The final stages of the
negotiations are best told in the protocol of a conference held
between Mr. Bidlack and Mr. Mallarino signed at the same
time with the treaty.
" Senate Doc., 58th Cong., Ist Session, No. 17, P.

22.

" Italics in original.
" Senate Document, 58th Cong., ist Session, No. 17, p. 24.
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"In reference to the first point, newly introduced by Mr.
Mallarino in the thirty-fifth article (the guarantee clause),
Mr. Bidlack stated that the obligation to guaranty the integral possession of those portions of territory between the continents that 'the universal mercantile interest require to be
free and open to all nations' might quoad hoc be considered
at least a quasi alliance; and to some extent contrary to the
policy of the United States; for agreeing to which, the abolition of all differential duties might not be considered a
sufficient equivalent."
Mr. Bidlack stated, moreover, that the abolition of the differential duties "was reciprocal, and therefore could not
fairly give to either of the high contracting parties a claim
for other equivalents; but he frankly admitted that the Government of the United States was desirous of the abolition
of these differential duties, and might be willing to receive it
as a partial consideration of the proposed guarantee. He,
however, contended that this guarantee of territory, and the
guarantee of "the right of way" over said territory, or what
had been termed "the right of transit" over the interoceanic
passage should also be reciprocal and included in the same
treaty.
"All these propositions having been accepted after a slight
discussion, the first point of the thirty-fifth article was accordingly altered, and it was further agreed that the treaty
should be finally signed at the same time with this protocol,
on Saturday, the 12th instant." 39
Summarizing the negotiations which led up to the treaty,
we have the following: The American guarantees were first
proposed and always insisted upon by the Granadian Secretary. The great object in view on his part seems to have
been to secure American support against European and especially English aggression. Nevertheless he stoutly maintained that it was necessary for the United States to give
this support in their own interests and he argues to this
effect at great length. He was, however, especially anxious
that the guarantee should appear in the form of a burden as
Senate DoCument, 58th Cong., ist Session, No. 17, p. I6.
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a consideration for the abolition of the differential duties,
and this for two reasons: first, lest England claim the exemption from differential duties under the favored nation
clause; second, because he wished to force England to join
in the guarantee in order to secure the abolition of the duties.
Mr. Bidlack was at first reluctant to grant the guarantee,
because it might constitute an entangling alliance. Later,
however, he concluded that it would be for the advantage of
the United States to make the guarantee. Nevertheless, he
made as good a bargain as he could with Mr. Mallarino.
He required, besides the abolition of the differential duties,
a reciprocal guarantee of the right of way on the part of
Granada; "and the first point of the thirty-fifth article was
accordingly altered." When we look at the article as altered
we see that all the changes suggested by Mr. Bidlack were
included. We find a guarantee of the free transit on the
part of Granada; this guarantee jointly with the abolition
of the duties is made the consideration for the American
guarantee. But we find something else. We find the provision, "And, in order to secure to themselves the tranquil
and constant enjoyment of these advantages." This is a new
idea. We know it did not originate with Mr. Mallarino.
He was especially anxious that the American guarantee
should appear as a burden, as a consideration for the abolition of the differentials. We also know that Mr. Bidlack
had used an almost identical expression in his report to Mr.
Buchanan when he said "That in order to preserve the
rights and privileges thus ceded it would be both the policy,
the interest, and the duty of the United States thus to enter
into an obligation to protect them." The inference is irresistible that Mr. Bidlack, while willing to meet Mr. Mallarino's diplomatic necessities by making the American guarantees appear as a burden, had at the last moment secured the
adoption into the treaty of his new-found faith that they
were also a benefit. And so the two reasons were given and
the guarantee was made both a right and a duty.
That President Polk agreed with Mr. Bidlack in regarding
the guarantee as a benefit to the United States is apparent
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from the often quoted phrase in the message transmitting the
treaty to the Senate:
"The treaty does not propose to guaranty a territory to a
foreign nation in which the United States will have no common interest with that nation. On the contrary, we are more
deeply and directly interested in the subject of this guaranty
than New Granada herself or any other power." 40
The question as to whether it was necessary for the United
States to wait for the permission of Colombia to enforce the
guarantee of the treaty of 1846 arose in connection with an
amusing incident in 1866.41 Alexander McKee, United
States consul at Panama, died Sept. ist, 1866. While the
President of the State of Panama, surrounded by his functionaries, was on his way to attend the funeral he perceived
that a party of armed people belonging to the marine of the
North American Union had disembarked, together with a
band of music, and he was " under the painful necessity of
declining and causing the other authorities to decline attending said obsequies, because permission to disembark said
force had not been asked of him." The President therefore
protested to the American admiral in charge against this
conduct, and going beyond the matter in hand he announced
that in case it should "be necessary to disembark forces in
the future" it must not be done without his consent.4 2 Ad'Message

to Senate, Feb. z5th, 1847.

" This is not the first reference to the matter to be found in the
despatches. Consul Rice in his report to the Department of the landing of American marines with the permission of the local authorities
in March, 1856, takes occasion to say:
" But without such permission we should have deemed it proper to
land the marines under the instructions to Consul McKee and myself
from the Government at Washington . . embodied in a despatch from
the Secretary of the Navy, at the instance of the Secretary of State,
to the commander of the ship-of-war on this station, dated June 21st,
1862, from which I quote: 'You will therefore put yourself in communication with the United States consuls on the Isthmus, and upon their
requisition use the force at your command for the protection of Americans in their person and property, and for the security of the railroad
company in all their rights.' It is believed that the United States has
always maintained the view expressed in these instructions." See Mr.
Rice to Mr. Seward, March 15th, 1865, Senate Document, 58th Congress, 2d Session, No. 143, p. 26.
'Foreign Relations, 1866, p. 459.
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miral Pearson responded, explaining that the marines were
without ball cartridges and that the band was unarmed, and
apologizing for his failure to obtain permission before landing in the particular instance, but taking up the challenge
contained in the obiter remarks of the President at the close
of his letter he avowed his intention under the sanction of
the treaty of landing to preserve order whenever it became
necessary, with or without permission.43 This apology seems
to have been considered worse than the original offence. It
was communicated by the President of Panama to the central
government and called forth a formal note to Minister Burton. The Colombian Secretary says:
"Agreeably to the said thirty-fifth article, said guarantee
is expressly declared to be an especial compensation for
favors acquired by the United States of North America in
that State. The guarantee is, therefore, not a right pertaining to them, but an obligation, a service, contracted by them,
which redounds to their interest, but which cannot take the
character of a power or jurisdiction. But by giving to said
guarantee the interpretation implied in the pretensions of
Rear-Admiral Pearson, it would be converted into an additional favor to the United States of North America, a favor
which would require on the'part of Colombia the abdication
of her sovereignty." . . . "The way or transit across the

Isthmus shall be open to the citizens and Government of the
United States of North America, agreeably to said Article
35, but neither this nor any other article of the treaty implies
the right of disembarking troops on that territory without
previous notice, and then subject to the conditions of the
treaty." . . .44
It would be easy to agree with these conclusions if the
premise was sound, but, as we have seen, the guarantee was
in form and in substance both a benefit and a burden.
Minister Burton referred this correspondence to Secretary
Seward, who thus had an opportunity to pass upon the point
in which we -are interested. Unfortunately for us, Seward
'Foreign Relations, i866, p. 46o.
"Ibid., p. 458.
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was. conducting the State Department instead of writing a
commentary on the treaty for the benefit of posterity. In
an elaborate despatch five pages long he evades the point as
follows:
"The entire controversy is uncalled for by any proceedings which have been taken by Admiral Pearson, or by any
exigency that has arisen in our relations with the Government of Colombia. . . . We are not now under any necessity to confess the obligations or to claim the benefits which
result from that most interesting relation. . . . A government cannot justly be expected to give explanations and
guarantees in regard to the course it will adopt in hypothetical cases, where it has neither itself done, nor suffered
its agents to do, any act which implies a want of fidelity to
its treaties and other international obligations." 5
Seward concludes his despatch with a few general observations upon the respective rights and duties arising under
the treaty and the spirit in which they would be approached
by the United States which will be quoted hereafter.
It is gratifying to know that. Seward's purpose was accomplished. The President of Colombia read the despatch
with " peculiar satisfaction" and the Secretary was of the
opinion "that the correct estimate placed upon the facts
which have led to this communication have fixed definitely
the meaning of the treaty, and will serve as a point of departure for whatever political emergencymayoccur." 46 Secretary Seward evidently did not let the American naval officers find out that he had provided any point of "departure"
from their customary conduct, for in August, 1867, we find
the Colombian Government again complaining of the unauthorized landing of American marines, which, as Mr.
Burton reported to Secretary Seward, he was "unofficially
informed" originated in naval officers mistaking rockets sent
up in the city by the populace on a holy day for. the signs
agreed upon by the United States consul, naval officers, and
' Foreign Relations, 1866-67, p. 526.
"Ibid., P. 565.
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of forces to protect AmeriPanama Railroad for the landing
47
property."
and
citizens
can
The question which Secretary Seward waived aside in
i866 has never been satisfactorily answered, owing to the
fact that Colombia has been only too glad to secure the presence of American troops on the Isthmus. According to the
report submitted to the Senate on behalf of the State Department in response to a resolution inquiring into the
various occasions on which American forces have been
landed on the Isthmus and the circumstances under which it
has been done, it appears that American troops have been
landed four times since i866--viz., in 1873, 1885, 19oI, and
1902. In all of these occasions except the last the Colombian
Government suggested or assented to the landing.48 In 1902
the landing was made "solely on the initiative of the United
States, the local authorities being notified in advance." Although the Colombian Government and its local officials
protested strongly against the methods employed to keep the
transit free upon this occasion, the published correspondence
does not show that any particular protest was made on the
ground that the landing was made without permission.
The failure to exercise a right when there has been no occasion for it is no argument against its existence. The fact
that the Colombian Government has been quick to request
American aid, and that, therefore, it has in general not been
necessary to volunteer assistance, does not indicate that it
would not have been proper to do so. And in the only in' Foreign Relations, 1866, p. 568.
'Senate Document, 58th Congress, 2d Session, No. 143, p. 3.
In i885, however, under President Cleveland, while it appears as a
matter of fact that the American marines were not landed until requested by the local authorities, Secretary Bayard's whole attitude,
as reflected in a conversation with the Colombian Minister on April
3d, 1885, and formally recorded in a note of the Colombian Minister
to Mr. Bayard the following day, was to the effect that he did not
consider the request of Colombia a necessary prerequisite to intervention on the part of the United States. Mr. Bayard formally declared "that the United States forces were to be sent to the Isthmus
in pursuance of the spontaneous action of the United States Government." See Commander Clark to Mr. Chandler, Jan. 18th, 1885, Senate
Document, 58th Cong., 2d Session, No. 143, P. 53; Mr. Becerra to Mr.
Bayard, April 4th, 1885, Ibid., p. 6I.
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stance where the United States acted on its own motion the
Colombian Government does not seem to have protested.
There is certainly no practical construction to control- the
result which we have reached from the examination of the
text of the treaty and the circumstances of its origin. We
must conclude that the United States have the right under
the treaty to land forces to protect the transit route when49
ever in their opinion the local authorities cannot protect it.
'It has been frequently argued (see North American Review for
February, I9o4, article on "The Fifty Mile Order") that the fact that
President Buchanan in three annual messages and one special message
asked Congress to empower the President to intervene to protect the
free transit from sea to sea via .Nicaragua, Panama, and Tehuantepec,
indicates that he did not believe that the United States had the right
to enforce the guarantees of the treaty of 1846 on their own motion.
Careful examination of the messages shows that President Buchanan's
difficulties were with Constitutional rather than International Law. He
notes the fact that the United States had a treaty in regard to Panama
and refers to it as follows:
"In reference to the Panama route the United Siates by their existing treaty with New Granada expressly guarantee the neutrality of the
Isthmus 'with the view that the free transit from one to the other sea
may not be interrupted or embarrassed at any future time while this
treaty exists." . .. "These treaty stipulations with New Granada and
Mexico, in addition to the considerations applicable to the Nicaragua
route, seem to require legislation for the purpose of carrying them into
effect" (Richardson, Vol. 5,p. 517.)
Nevertheless he classes together, intervention to protect the Panama
route according to the provisions of the treaty, intervention ill Nicaragua without any treaty, and general intervention to protect the lives
and property of American citizens in emergencies in all revolutionary
ports, and asks Congress to give him power to act in all these cases.
He says:
"He (the President) cannot without transcending his constitutional
power direct a gun to be fired into a port or land a seaman or marine
to protect the lives of our countrymen on shore or to obtain redress
for a recent outrage on their property." (Richardson, Vol. 5,P. 539.)
President Buchanan needed no authority according to our municipal
law to act under the treaty or in general emergencies. Congress could
give him none under International Law to take charge of the transit
route in Nicaragua without a treaty. If he had merely asked for power
to intervene under the treaty his course would have been an authority
for the construction of the treaty adopted in this article. As it is, his
views cannot be regarded as an authority for anything unless it be the
doctrines of International Law which he had formerly expressed in the
Ostend Manifesto and the doctrines of Constitutional Law which he
later expressed when he declined to coerce a sovereign state. See
Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. 5,pp. 447,
515-17, 538, 569.
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We have seen that the American guarantee of the neutrality of the Isthmus with the view that transit may not be
interrupted extends to disturbances growing out of domestic
insurrection as well as foreign wars. We have decided that
this guarantee is both a privilege and a burden, and that the
United States may therefore intervene upon their own motion
to render it effective. We come now to the third question in
construing this guarantee: Does this right to intervene to
protect the transit route imply the right to exclude Colombia
from her own territory as a means of securing tranquillity?
In other words, may the United States forces engaged in
fulfilling the guarantee by maintaining the freedom of transit, prohibit the transportation of Colombian national troops
by the Panama Railroad in case such use would tend to turn
the transit route into a theatre of hostilities? "
Let us for the sake of the argument make two violent assumptions: first, that the American guarantee is purely a
benefit to the United States; second, that the question is in
no way affected by the fact that Colombia also guarantees
the freedom of transit. Even on these assumptions it is submitted that the treaty would not justify the exclusion of
Colombia from her own territory. The rule of construction
to be applied in such cases is elementary. Turning once more
to Hall, we find it stated as follows:
Whenever, or in so far as a state does not contract itself
The position taken in the text in regard to the duty of the United

States to permit Colombia to use the transit route in defence of her

sovereignty renders it unnecessary to discuss the precise amount of
territory which could properly be neutralized if a contrary view were
taken. In any event, the question is purely academic, as it is admitted
that whether the "fifty-mile order" and other similar orders were
justifiable or not they were never acted on. The only interference on
the part of the United States forces with the Colombian troops during
the revolution was the prohibition of the use of the railroad by the
Colombian troops on the mornings of Nov. 4th and 5th, i9o3. If the
United States had a right to neutralize any zone of any dimensions
this action was clearly within the narrowest limits which could be
suggested. Incidentally it may be added that there is good Colombian
authority for the position of the administration that any disturbance on
the Isthmus is likely to disturb transit. (Mr. Herran to Mr. Seward,
June 26th, 1862; Mr. Burton to Commander Preble, Aug. 3ist, 1865.
See Senate Document, 58th Cong., 2d Session, No. 143, pp. 12 and 31.)

THE PANAMA

SITUATION.

out of its fundamental legal rights by express language, a
treaty must be so construed as to give effect to those rights.
Thus, for example, no treaty can be taken to restrict, by
implication, the rights of sovereignty or property or selfpreservation. Any restriction of such rights must be effected
in a clear and distinct manner.5 1
No nation will be presumed to have deeded away the right
to fight for its own life on its own territory at all times unless
the grant has been made in clear and unmistakable language.
It is not pretended that the right to exclude Colombia from
her own territory is expressly granted. The argument for
the existence of such a grant by implication runs something
like this: The United States have a right to protect the
transit; the United States are not bound to aid Colombia
in a civil war; to allow Colombia to use the railroad during
a civil war would tend to provoke attacks on the road by the
insurgents and might involve the United States in the civil
war; therefore the United States have the right to exclude
the Colombian troops from the transit route.
To assent to this proposition is in effect to say that the
grant of a privilege by one nation to another carries with it
to the grantee the right in case of civil war to destroy the
grantor rather than run the risk of a temporary impairment
of the privilege. It is like denying to the master of a house
the right to resist robbers on the ground that it might disturb
the business of a tenant. This will never do. The fact that
New Granada and her successor, Colombia, have been weak,
corrupt, inefficient nations; that revolutions have been the
rule rather than the exception; that the United States is a
great nation ready to act as the trustee for civilization-all
these considerations affect the ethics of the situation but not
the law. "Russia and Geneva are equal" in the eye of the
law. And in order to find out what the law is we must
assume for Colombia the strength of one and the beneficence
of the other. Even on the inadmissible assumptions that the
American guarantee is purely a benefit to the United States
and that the Colombian guarantee does not affect the ques" Hall, International Law, 4th edition, pp. 354, 355.
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tion, it is submitted that there is no such irresistible implication as is indispensably necessary if we are to construe the
treaty to grant to the United States the right to exclude
Colombia from her own territory.
But as a matter of fact we know that the American guarantee is not only a benefit but a burden. Whether exercised
as a right or a duty its nature is unchanged. Whether the
United States forces are landed with or without the permission of the Colombian authorities, their rights are the same,
once they are landed.* If the United States forces may exclude the Colombian forces from their own territory in one
case, they may in the other. And it will hardly be contended
that Colombia would stipulate with the United States for
the right to call upon the United States to maintain free
transit through Colombian territory at the price of excluding
Colombia from sovereignty over her territory.
Again we have seen that as a matter of fact Colombia
herself guarantees to the United States the free transit of
the Isthmus and thereby becomes liable for failure to maintain the same. If we construe the American guarantee to
authorize the United States to exclude the Colombian forces
from the transit route, we have a treaty which in one clause
imposes a duty upon Colombia and in the other gives the
United States the right to prevent her from performing that
duty.
We may admit that the precise adjustment of rights and
duties between the two guaranteeing nations is left rather
vague by the treaty, and that no construction is entirely free
from difficulties, but taking the treaty as a whole, bearing in
mind the fact that Colombia is a guarantor of the freedom
of transit as well as the United States, that the American
guarantee is a burden as well as a benefit, and especially remembering that a treaty is not to be construed to forfeit
essential rights by doubtful implications, we must conclude
that as far as we can judge from the words of the treaty the
United States do not have the right to exclude the Colombian
forces from the transit route.
When we turn from the words of the treaty to their practical administration we find no such established interpreta-
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tion contrary to the conclusions which we have reached as
would justify us in changing our view. There is very little
authority which is in point. There is a general expression
of Secretary Seward's in 1865 contained in the closing paragraph of his note in regard to the controversy over the landing of American marines without permission from the Colombian authorities 52 which is often quoted and which so far
as it goes sustains the contention adopted. Mr. Seward
wrote:
"The United States desires nothing else, nothing better,
and nothing more in regard to the States of Colombia than
the enjoyment on their part of complete and absolute sovereignty and independence. If those great interests shall
ever be assailed by any power at home or abroad, the United
States will be ready, co-operating with the government and
their ally, to maintain and defend them. Such co-operation
will be in accordance not merely with the terms of the treaty,
but also in accordance with the respect which is due to the
sovereignty of that ally, and to the courtesies which friendship inspires, and which are invariably practised between
friendly and enlightened nations."
While the precise question as to whether the Colombian
forces could be excluded from the transit route during the
time the American forces were on guard does not seem to
have been covered by any instructions issued to the expeditionary force in 1885, the general tenor of these instructions
is very deferential to the Colombian Government, and the
tone of the instructions was reflected in the conduct of the
American troops. While the revolutionists were handled
without gloves, the national forces were afforded every facility to reconquer the Isthmus.
The practical conduct of the expedition as well as the attitude of the. United States Government is well set forth by
the account given by President Cleveland in his Annual Message in 1885. He says: "Desirous of exercising only the
powers expressly reserved to us by the treaty, and mindful of
'Mr. Seward to Mr. Burton, April 3oth, 1866, Foreign Relations,

1866-67, p. 531.
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the rights of Colombia, the forces sent to the Isthmus were
instructed to confine their action to positively and efficaciously 'preserving the transit and its accessories from being
interrupted or embarrassed.' The execution of this delicate
and responsible task necessarily involved police control where
the local authority was temporarily powerless, but always in
aid of the sovereignty of Colombia. 3 The prompt and successful fulfilment of its duty by this government was highly
appreciated by the Government of Colombia, and has been
followed by expressions of satisfaction. High praise is due
to the officers and men engaged in this service. The restoration of peace on the Isthmus by the re-establishment of the
constituted government there being thus accomplished, the
forces of the United States were withdrawn."
President Cleveland evidently took the view that the rights
of the United States under the treaty were subject to the
rights of sovereignty and self-preservation of Colombia.
On the other hand, in 19Ol and 1902 the American commanders were instructed to prohibit the use of the railroad by
Colombian forces in case it was likely to convert the line of
transit into a theatre of hostilities. In accordance with these
instructions the American officers on the Isthmus for a considerable time declined to permit the transportation of Colombian troops by the Panama Railroad. As late as Oct.
29th -Rear-Admiral Casey gave strict orders to the officials
of the Panama Railroad to decline to transport Colombian
troops without special authority from the American Commander-in-Chief. 4 This action caused. great dissatisfaction
on the part of the Colombian authorities and was made the
occasion of urgent diplomatic remonstrance. As a result,
on Oct. 29th ihe Navy Department telegraphed RearAdmiral Casey as follows:
"While approving your attitude the Department wishes
to impress upon you that the relations of the United States
with Colombia are much strained. You must adopt measures
as conciliatory as is consistent with dignity United States,
"Italics mine.

Senate Document, 58th Congress, Special Session, No. Io, p. 72.
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overlooking matter of minor importance. Negotiations for
ship canal are at present at standstill on account of feeling
of irritation on part of Colombian representative." 55
Two days later, when the Colombian commander asked
Rear-Admiral Casey-whether it would be "inconvenient"
for his troops to be transported by the railroad the latter
acted on the above hint from the Department, and replied
that it would cause no "inconvenience for the ,government
troops to be transported by train from Colon to San Pablo
or from Colon or Panama to other places on the road."
Admiral Casey added the hope that General Perdomo would
"instruct his command to avoid as far as possible interrupting the transit of the train in any way or converting the line
of the road into a theatre of hostilities.5 6
To offset the interpretation of the guarantee clause derived
from the treaty itself, read in the light of the principles of
construction applicable thereto and clearly adopted by President Cleveland in 1885, we have the contrary ruling of the
United States Government in 19oI and 1902, which evoked

bitter protests from Colombia and as a consequence was
abandoned in practice even if maintained in theory. There
is certainly no such a sustained course of practice sanctioned
by both countries as would justify us in departing from the
construction adopted above-viz., that the United States
must exercise its rights under the guarantee clause of the
treaty subject to the primary rights of sovereignty and selfpreservation inhering in Colombia.
Summarizing the results of our investigations as to the
proper construction of the thirty-fifth article of the treaty of
1846, it is submitted that they establish the following propositions :
ist. The guarantee of the sovereignty and property of
New Granada over the Isthmus of Panama does not bind the
*United States to defend this sovereignty against domestic
insurrection even if the revolution should result in the independence of Panama.
Senate Document, 58th Cong.; Special Session, No. io, p. 93.
Ibid., P. 73.
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2d. The United States do guarantee the sovereignty and
property of New Granada over Panama as against foreign
powers, European or American.
3d. New Granada guarantees to the United States and
their citizens the right of free transit over the Isthmus. This
imposes upon New Granada the primary duty to maintain
this freedom of transit.
4 th. The United States guarantee the neutrality of the
Isthmus in order that free transit may not be interrupted.
This guarantee is effective against any interruption of the
transit whether proceeding from domestic difficulties or foreign wars.
5th. This guarantee is both a benefit and a burden to each
of the contracting parties and may therefore be enforced on
the initiative of either.
6th. Although the United States may enforce this guarantee unasked, they must do so subject to the paramount
rights of sovereignty and self-defence which are reserved to
the local sovereign since nowhere expressly granted away.
7th. The ordinary rights of every nation to safeguard its
interests and to seek redress for the violation of treaty rights,
are limited by the provision that neither party shall resort to
self-help on account of any supposed violation of the above
treaty rights until a statement of damages and a claim for
redress has been made to the opposite party without obtaining satisfaction.
Applying these conclusions of law to the well-known facts
of the revolution in Panama, we see that the United States
were not bound to put down that revolution at the request
of Colombia; that the United States were acting within their
treaty rights in landing men to preserve the freedom of
transit whenever it seemed necessary, with or without the
permission of Colombia, but that the treaty does not give the
right to the United States to exclude the forces of their ally
and co-guarantor from her own territory because the presence
of these forces is likely to render the task of the United States
more difficult; and that the United States were therefore
technically not justified by any or all the provisions of the
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proceeding to Panama on the morning after the revolution.
This was an act of political intervention; its justification
must be found in considerations of ethics and expediency. It
cannot be found in law. " "
William Cullen Dennis.
"It is not seriously alleged that at the time of the American intervention Colombia had been guilty of any violation of the treaty of 1846
which would have justified the United States in taking action by way
of reprisals or otherwise, according to the general rules of International
Law.'
It is rather suggested than asserted that the treaty of 1846 obligated New Granada and Colombia to permit the construction of a canal
across the Isthmus and therefore to negotiate and ratify a treaty with
the United States to that end. It is indeed obvious that the treaty of
1846 looked forirard to a subsequent convention which should define
the meaning and secure the objects of the original treaty according to
the developing needs of Isthmian traffic. As Mr. Mallarino suggested
in his secret memorandum (see supra), the treaty "could be completed
and perfected by a subsequent and complementary convention, in which
the transit of the interoceanic passage should be arranged, and its permuanent neutrality strengthened" (italics in original). But it is equally
obvious that even if there had been an express provision calling for
a subsequent treaty the high contracting parties had an equal right to
decide upon its terms and to ratify or reject it after negotiation according to International and Constitutional Law. As a matter of fact, the
two countries had negotiated at least four separate times in regard to
such a treaty; upon two of these occasions the negotiations resulted in
full-fledged treaties, one of which failed of ratification through the
action of the Colombian Congress, and the other because of the indifference of the United States Sendte. (See as to legal duty to negotiate
a treaty Mr. Hay to General Reyes, Jan. 5th, x9o4, Senate Document,
58th Congress, 2d Session, No. 95, p. 22.) As to the moral obligation
resting on Colombia to ratify a proper canal treaty, that is another
matter. (See the President's Special Message, Jan. 4th, i9o4, Senate
Document, 58th Congress, 2d Session, No. 53, P. 23.)
The absurdity of the claim that the treaty of i846 imposes a legal
obligation on the contracting parties to unite in any supplementary
convention becomes more manifest when we remember that the treaty
of i846 provides for its own termination at any time at the option of
either party on twelve-months' notice.
Even if some violation of the treaty on the part of Colombia could
be established, by the very terms of the treaty itself it would not
justify self-help on the part of the United States until after a formal
and unsuccessful appeal to Colombia for redress through diplomatic
channels. No such appeal had been made.

